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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 06/03/2011

Accident number: 681

Accident time: 10:40

Accident Date: 21/07/2009

Where it occurred: MF 30910965,
Kandahar Airport,
Daman district,
Kandahar province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 29/09/2009

ID original source: OPS,14/01-20, Ref:
09/10/326

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: dry/dusty
hard
Date last modified: 06/03/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
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Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a “Lessons
Learned” summary provided as a PDF file. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some
of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be
revised as more information becomes available.
The Lessons Learned summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)
File: OPS,14/01-20, Date: September 29, 2009. Ref: 09/10/326
Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] DT# 3
DEMINING ACCIDENT
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of [Demining group] DT# 3
demining accident occurred on 21 July 2009 in Kandahar airport, Daman district of Kandahar
province.
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-03 MINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by the AMAC South to investigate the demining accident
involving [the Victim] the Deminer of [Demining group] DT-03. The accident occurred at 10:40
hours on 21 July 2009 at the minefield number 30910965, located in Kandahar Airport,
Daman district of Kandahar province.
SUMMARY:
ME # 309/0965 is an anti-personal mine contaminated site around Kandahar Airbase. During
the Russian invasion a big security belt of landmine was established by the government
forces to secure the airbase from the attacks of Mujahedeen. This minefield is one of the
minefields covered in the above mentioned large size of contaminated area.
As the task is located inside Kandahar Air Field (KAF) and as well as the victim is evacuated
to the coalition force military base hospital. Therefore, due to security consideration of
coalition forces the investigation team was not allowed to physically observe the accident
scene and conduct interview with victim deminer.
According to the statement of team leader, section leader and medical report the findings of
investigation team are as follows:
On 21 July 2009 while deminer [the Victim] was working in his clearance lane, investigating a
detected signal with his hand trowel, he hit a mine on its top and caused it to go off. The
weather was hot and the ground surface was hard and dry, so it seems that the deminer had
used his excavation tool by force and carelessly and directly on pinpointed spot so touched
the top of mine and caused the accident. As the deminer was dressed with PPE (vest, helmet
and visor according to [Demining group] SOPs), so his face, neck and chest remained safe.
As he was working in squatting position, so his both legs were injured and also he got fracture
to his right hand fingers. The injuries to both legs of deminer were preventable if the apron or
lower limbs covering PPE was used.
CONCLUSIONS:
The investigation team concluded that the carelessness of deminer caused the accident. But
the main element involved in accidents together with other causes is poor supervision.
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
a. Hard grounds are to be prepared by machines first and then to be dealt manually.
b. [Demining group] is recommended to consider lower limb cover in terms of PPE and
amend their SOP accordingly.
c. The deminer should not hurry up during the excavation drill, be careful and do not use the
prodding/excavation tools carelessly.
d. The team command group should strictly control the deminers during operation and
immediately stop them while practicing in contrary to standard operating procedures.

Victim Report
Victim number: 865

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Hands, severe Legs
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that there was “poor supervision”. The secondary cause is listed as
Inadequate equipment because the hand tool being used by the deminer was too short and
was not blast resistant (as recommended in the IMAS) and so is likely to have contributed to
his injury.
It is bizarre that the deminers were permitted to work in this “security” area but that the
investigators were not permitted to enter the area to conduct a post-accident investigation.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The presence of the accident summary
implies that a full and comprehensive accident investigation was made, but not made
available for others to learn from.

3

